

# HARVESTS OF NORTHERN FRANCE GO TO FEED GERMANY



The manual of rakes. Soldiers under the command of their officers ready to start for the harvest field.



The harvest squad in action. Threshing the grain.

One of the sidelight mysteries of the war is the manner in which Germany has been feeding her closely congested population, cut off as she is from the granaries of the world. These photographs, recently received in America, illustrate how the German system takes advantage of every opportunity to meet this situation and to make up for the lack of imports. On the opposite page is shown diagrammatically a comparison, by the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, of the food supply and industries of Germany before the war and as they are asserted to be at present.

## THE UKRAINE, A FORGOTTEN NATION THAT MAY SEPARATE FROM RUSSIA

### Possibilities the War Holds for Little Known Race Who Under Mazepa Revolted Against Peter the Great

By PROF. JACOB WITTMER, HARTMAN.

IN the eighth book of Voltaire's "Histoire de Charles XII," which was written at a time when Sweden's mad King was still a real element in the youthful remembrance of everybody in Europe, this famous French writer says:

"The Ukraine has always aspired to be free, but being wedged in between Muscovy, the states of the Grand Seigneur and Poland, it has always had to seek a protector, and consequently, a master, among these three states. First they put themselves under the protection of Poland, which treated them too much as a subject state; then they handed themselves over to the Muscovite, who governed them as slaves, as much as he could. At first the Ukrainians enjoyed the privilege of electing a ruler, whom they called 'General' (Hetman); but soon they were deprived of this right, and this 'General' was appointed by the Court of Moscow."

And then Voltaire goes on to recount the fascinating tale of the Hetman Mazepa and his revolt against Peter the Great, his alliance with Charles XII, with the object of breaking the power of the Muscovite, and his dramatic death at Bender in 1709, from poison self-administered. But we have already read these things elsewhere, if only in Bayard's highly colored poem, prepared for our delectation by the brilliant writer of music programmes.

But what about the nation that Voltaire has here described—what is the Ukraine? How many persons in America have ever heard anything about this country, aside from the striking reference in Voltaire's "Histoire de Charles XII."

The Ukraine was a nation occupying much of southern Russia and even dipping over into what is now the Austrian (Czech) Province of Galicia. Ethnographically, the people occupying the territory along the north shore of the Black Sea and extending into the forests of Bessarabia and the north to the Caspian Sea on the east, and to the Carpathians on the west—this people has ethnographically always been the Ukrainian strain, and even politically has several times achieved a successful form of self-government, although no Voltaire's little paragraph suggests they have been much oppressed by their more powerful neighbors.

About thirty-five million people, belonging to the great Slavic race, of which they consider themselves to be the purest, least contaminated representatives, occupy this territory, the great majority, of course, in Russia, some thirty millions, the remainder in Galicia, some few even in the neighboring Kingdom of Hungary. Their language is purely Slavic, and is called "Little Russian" by the "Great Russians" or Muscovites. They themselves do not like to be termed Little Russians and prefer, both for themselves and for their language, the appellation Ukrainian. In fact, in Austria they receive still another name, that of "Ruthenian."

It would be possible to regard Little Russian as one of the three great dialects into which the Russian language may be divided (the two other dialects being Great Russian and White Russian), but a closer scientific study of the language reveals the fact that in many respects it represents more original Slavic conditions than does its powerful neighbor, the Great Russian, and it is therefore just as reasonable to regard it as an independent language, having characteristics sharply distinguished as those of the Great Russian. And this view is the one which is most sympathetic to those who speak the Ukrainian language.

In speaking of the Ukrainians we are therefore dealing with a country which has a distinct geographical outline, a population as large as that of Italy, a language as distinct from Russian as English is from German, and, as we shall presently see, a historical tradition of aboriginal freedom, having characteristics sharply distinguished as those of the great Slavic family.

Yet this nation is unknown. Books and pamphlets are appearing in England, America and elsewhere written

which the entire civil administration passed into the hands of the imperial authorities, and the Cossacks themselves ceased to exist as a distinct nationality. They survived, however, as a distinct class, whose part it now became to serve Russia by securing the annexation of the Crimea and the newly acquired position on the Black Sea.

In order to reconcile the landowners of Little Russia to her policy, Catherine carried into effect a measure abolishing freedom of settlement for Little Russian peasants. In 1783 she introduced serfdom into Little Russia, where it did not as yet exist, although the local conditions were, of course, ripe for its introduction. Naturally, Catherine's measures could

not bridge over the gulf fixed between Great Russians and Little Russians; they rather tended to widen it. They were designed to guarantee the predominance of the Russian Cossack in the south, and, so far as possible, to weld north and south together, and thereby to assure its full value to the acquisition of the northern shore of the Black Sea.

"This was of course no final solution of the Ukrainian problem, which Catherine left to her successors to achieve. She also bequeathed to them the Polish question, which indeed she had created for Russia by means of the partitions, whereas the problem of the Ukraine she had inherited from the past."

So much as an indication that the ignorance of the Ukraine, which was so prevalent until recent years, is showing signs of weakening. At the present moment the presence of this people in Russia is a source of interesting speculation on many sides.

German diplomacy, for instance, might profit greatly from a sudden regeneration of the Ukrainian national movement. In fact, a number of Russian and Polish political writers have gone as far as to say that the whole movement is merely a recent German intrigue against Russia; just as, twenty years ago, it was branded by the Russians as a Polish intrigue against Russia. At the present moment the presence of this people in Russia is a source of interesting speculation on many sides.

Fifty years ago the Ukrainian movement started, not in Germany, not in Austria, but in Russia, and the fact that after it was transplanted to Austria it flourished there better than in the land of its birth is merely due to the fact that Austria is, so far as the treatment of its races is concerned,

one of the most liberal countries in Europe. Its Constitution is forty years older than that of Russia.

The history of the Ukraine is one that would justify the highest ambitions for a separate national existence as based on a proud record in the past. The Kingdom of the Ukraine (sometimes called the Kingdom of Kieff) was the first of all the Russian lands to attract the attention of historians. Under its King Vladimir the great it was the intermediary through which the Christian Byzantine culture civilized the pagan Muscovite hordes lying to the north. The Tatar invasions, however, which were destined to stunt the develop-

ment of the Ukraine, were the first for her son, impressed in the army of the Czar, of Ukrainian maidens betrayed by Muscovite warriors. His literary efforts soon led him into political activity, and in 1846 he was banished to Siberia, where he remained for ten years. During this period he was regarded as a Ukrainian national hero, and to this day it is in his works that the Ukrainian seeks inspiration in his hard battle for national recognition.

But it is not only in literature and politics that this forgotten people have begun to distinguish themselves. In the 70s of the nineteenth century a rather emphatic development of learning set in, evidenced by such interesting beginnings as that of the Kieff branch of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society.

The most important figure in this renaissance of Ukrainian learning was Dragomanov, to whom his studies meant, largely, a strengthening of his faith in the rebirth of the Ukraine as a nation. For his racial agitation Dragomanov was banished to western Europe, carrying with him to Galicia, where he remained for some time, the seeds of the new culture that it was so difficult to plant in the Russian Ukraine. And it was in Galicia that the present struggle for Ukrainian freedom really began.

Dragomanov resisted the Russophile element in that Austrian province, a resistance that was then more difficult than it has since become. It was he who gave the first big impetus to the movement for national independence by associating the racial issue with the new progressive ideas of western Europe.

The Russians have fostered an agitation in Galicia which is aimed at preparing the people for the conception that they are in reality Russians who are eager to be restored to their brethren in Russia by annexation. Vast sums of money have been spent in disseminating this doctrine, and it has not been difficult, with the aid of the Polish oppression, to organize in Galicia a conservative party of chiefly clerical character, which denies to the Ukrainians in Austria, Russia or America the right to consider themselves as anything else than Russians. This party, together with the Polish nobles in Eastern Galicia, was a very effective aid to the Russian army's advance into Austria in the fall of 1914, for they know that if Galicia remains Austrian the Ukrainian radicals will soon overthrow their authority.

There is no doubt of the reality of the danger threatening Russia in Galicia. The Ukrainian renaissance that has been fostered there means, culturally, politically, economically, a disruption of the Russian empire. The rich land of the south, the Little Russia of Prof. Bain, is the most prolific source of the empire's revenues, as with its wonderful resources of agriculture (its rich black earth), its iron, its coal, its petroleum, it constitutes almost all of the really productive portions of the empire. Now if this nation should really become independent it is easy to see how it would com-

eratic elements of the empire want to be a federation of free and independent states, nothing short, in fact, of a United States of central European races.

The two races in Austria that are furthest removed from the equality of treatment assured them by the Austrian Constitution are the Serbians in Bosnia and the Ukrainians in eastern Galicia. In both cases the badly treated race lacks a landed proprietor class of its own. But their attitude to Austria is quite different; while the Austrian Serbians are eager to disrupt the empire, if necessary, in order to achieve their union with Serbia, which some of them regard as their mother country, the Galician Ukrainians wish a closer union with Austria in order to escape being swallowed up by their Russian enemies.

It is very interesting to note the entirely different objects of the recent assassinations in the two provinces. When the Ukrainian student Miroslav Sichinsky shot Count Potocki, the Polish Governor of Galicia, in April, 1908, it was because he knew that Potocki was strengthening the grip of the Russophile party on Galicia and thus weakening the chances of the Ukrainians to profit by the Austrian Constitution, but when the Sarajevo murder cut short the life of the Austrian Archduke, his apparent intention in 1914, the intention was not to strengthen Austria, but to weaken her.

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### Long Dreamed of Freedom, or at Least Autonomy, at Last in Sight for 35,000,000 Population

completely block Russia's access to the Black Sea, just as the loss of the Baltic provinces would cut her off from the Baltic.

This would at first seem a cruel blow for Russia, but there is no doubt that Russia has another mission of far greater importance, and one that cannot be achieved at present by the Western Powers. While the culture of the Ukraine would receive its strongest stimuli from Germany, Austria and western Europe generally, Russia has problems in central Asia, in Siberia, in Turkestan, that are of magnificent scope, some of which she has already attacked with splendid energy and success. Her cultural work among the Mohammedans in Turkestan has been particularly noteworthy and laudable.

With regard to the prospects of a powerful new democracy in the Ukraine the outlook is perhaps not so promising as some Ukrainians would have us believe in the articles they contribute to foreign publications. When thirty million people have been deprived of self-government for so many centuries, their language barred from the schools and their land in the hands of a foreign (Polish or Russian) as the case may be aristocracy, the likelihood that they will suddenly develop an exceptional talent for self-government is very small.

The American people may be slow in learning about foreign races, but once the facts on the Ukrainian question have been put clearly before them they will see what the ambitions of this people mean for the development of Europe. The breaking up of Russia into a group of nations, corresponding to the natural, racial and economic-geographical units of the empire, such as Finland, the Baltic provinces, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Great Russia (together with Siberia)—this is one of the possible outcomes of the European war, one that will become more likely as the war is prolonged to a greater duration. In fact, of this a beginning has already been made in the cutting off of Poland.

The next step may be the separation of the Ukraine from Russia, already the armies of the central Powers have reconquered Galicia from Russian control, and occupied considerable areas of Russian Ukrainian territory (especially in the Government of Volhynia).

But if the division of Russia should not result, there would still be the extreme likelihood of a Russian federation, as outlined above, and in that case also we should wish to see the Ukraine achieve a full measure of autonomy. At any rate, whether the central European Powers or the Allies are victorious, it will be up to the dominant power of the victorious group, let us say, therefore, England or Germany, to formulate some line of action with regard to Russia's future, and therefore to the future of the Ukraine.

Americans will naturally prefer to have this task performed by England, and while England is not at the moment selfishly interested in the freeing of the Ukraine, as is the case with Germany, there is absolutely no doubt that England's ultimate interests require her to weaken a victorious Russia. The creation of a Ukrainian State would achieve this object by preventing the presence of a Russian navy in the Black Sea and thus—and this is of far greater importance—it would shut off Russia's access to the Mediterranean. She might then have freedom to develop without fear of Russian interference. Constantinople would not then be a Russian naval port to menace the peace of the entire Mediterranean.

We are looking far into the future, perhaps. The Ukraine, once a nation or an independent State in a loose federation, would begin to move out toward the outer world, and one of them would be to protect the Balkan States against any attempt at Austrian or German domination of them. But how different would be the protection of the Ukraine from that which Russia would grant?

While the Ukraine would be like a big brother shielding his younger brothers and sisters from foreign interference, Russia has offered them hitherto merely the protection that the lion's front off his lion's lamb after he has devoured it. For Russia all weaker Slavic nations are a sort of "Russia Irredenta," and Russia must conquer them at all costs. What their attitude is toward such absorption by Russia is now the better illustrated than in the history of Finland, Poland and the Ukraine.



Miroslav Sichinsky, the young Ukrainian student who, in 1908, shot Count Potocki, the Polish Governor of Galicia.



Map of southern Russia—shaded portion indicates area known as "Little Russia."